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What works in Graduate school does not necessarily work outside the academy. It is also an idea beloved of the far right who use the exact same language to justify it. Baudrillard, Jean, The Mirror of Production trans. Rastafari, A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. Progress Publishers, Moscow, Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. Sociology and Donald Trump http: Hitler and Nazi Germany.
I think this applies rather well to the Trump movement. Others may differ but I will not quibble over a word.
Trump is a destructive figure whether he can be successfully categorized as a Fascist or not. Thus, how closely his Fascism maps onto other historical Fascisms may be left to specialists to determine.
More hopefully though the far right, for now at least, has been checked in France and Holland. Similar notions of sanctuary in the contemporary world are, alas, the object of contempt on the far right. There is nothing at all to prevent Christian Fundamentalists or campus conservatives from casting themselves in this role once the narrative has been established.
Further, even the perception of a double standard in these matters will only re-inforce their conviction. Everything, though, is subject to the law of unintended consequences. When activists invoke this concept they think, naturally enough for university educated people, that they are conveying the denotation of the phrase: As these things are part of the experience of a tiny minority even of white people the phrase is dead on arrival.
Rhetoric in the ancient sense needs to be attended to as much as social science. The North American left is obsessed with words, no doubt as befits a movement whose milieu is the university, but apart from some real though modest gains in civility what have we gained from this obsessive focus but a spate of brutal neologisms? Environmental devastation and income inequality are getting worse not better and splitting hairs over vocabulary will not alter that fact.
It may be the case though in fact I doubt it that linguistic usage embodies in a straightforward way current oppressive social structures as opposed to Anglo-Saxon ones!
Vallor contends that we need a new way of understanding the projects of human flourishing and seeking the good life, and understanding which can help us reexamine how we make and participate through and with the technoscientific innovations of our time. Aristotelian ethics, Confucian Ethics, and Buddhism. Vallor breaks the work into three parts, and takes as her subject what she considers to be the four major world-changing technologies of the 21 st century.
As Vallor moves through each of the three sections and four topics, she maintains a constant habit of returning to the questions of exactly how each one will either help us cultivate a new technomoral virtue ethic, or how said ethic would need to be cultivated, in order to address it.
As both a stylistic and pedagogical choice, this works well, providing touchstones of reinforcement that mirror the process of intentional cultivation she discusses throughout the book. She notes that while there are many virtue traditions with their own ideas about what it means to flourish, there is a difference between recognizing multiple definitions of flourishing and a purely relativist claim that all definitions of flourishing are equal.
Not only that, but deontological and consequentialist ethics have always been this inflexible, and this inflexibility will only be more of a problem in the face of the challenges posed by the speed and potency of the four abovementioned technologies.
She says that these complex, synergistic systems of technology cannot be responded to and grappled with via rigid rules.
Vallor then folds in discussion of several of her predecessors in the philosophy of technology—thinkers like Hans Jonas and Albert Borgmann—giving a history of the conceptual frameworks by which philosophers have tried to deal with technological drift and lurch.
From here, she decides that each of these theorists has helped to get us part of the way, but their theories all need some alterations in order to fully succeed. Vallor says that what we learn from them will fuel the project of building a wholly new virtue tradition. If we look at the thin concepts, Vallor says, we can see the bone structure of these traditions is made of 4 shared commitments:. All of this is meant to be supported by and to help foster goods like global community, intercultural understanding, and collective human wisdom.
But Vallor says that a virtue tradition, new or old, need not be universal in order to do real, lasting work; it only needs to be engaged in by enough people to move the global needle.
And while there may be differences in rendering these ideas from one person or culture to the next, if we do the work of intentional cultivation of a pluralist ethics, then we can work from diverse standpoints, toward one goal.
To do this, we will need to intentionally craft both ourselves and our communities and societies. Part II does the work of laying out the process of technomoral cultivation. Starting in chapter 3, Vallor once again places Aristotle, Kongzi Confucius , and the Buddha in conceptual conversation, asking what we can come to understand from each.
From there, she moves on to detailing the actual process of cultivating the technomoral self, listing seven key intentional practices that will aid in this:. Moral Habituation is the first step on this list, because it is the quality at the foundation of all of the others: And, we have to remember that while all seven steps must be undertaken continually, they also have to be undertaken communally.
Only by working with others can we build systems and societies necessary to sustain these values in the world. Rather, these twelve things together form system by which to understand the most crucial qualities for dealing with our 21 st century lives. In this way we can both cultivate virtuous responses within ourselves and our existing communities, and also begin to more intentionally create new individual, cultural, and global systems. Exploring how new social media, surveillance cultures, robots and AI, and biomedical enhancement technologies are set to shape our world in radically new ways, and how we can develop new habits of engagement with them.
Each technology is explored in its own chapter so as to better explore which virtues best suit which topic, which good might be expressed by or in spite of each field, and which cultivation practices will be required within each. In this way, Vallor highlights the real dangers of failing to skillfully adapt to the requirements of each of these unprecedented challenges.
While Vallor considers most every aspect of this project in great detail, there are points throughout the text where she seems to fall prey to some of the same technological pessimism, utopianism, or determinism for which she rightly calls out other thinkers, in earlier chapters. There is still a sense that these technologies are, of their nature, terrifying, and that all we can do is rein them in. Additionally, her crucial point seems to be that through intentional cultivation of the self and our society, or that through our personally grappling with these tasks, we can move the world, a stance which leaves out, for instance, notions of potential socioeconomic or political resistance to these moves.
There are those with a vested interest in not having a more mindful and intentional technomoral ethos, because that would undercut how they make their money. If this is the case, then there will already be a shared conceptual background between Vallor and many of the other scholars whom she intends to make help her to do the hard work of changing how people think about their values.
While the implications of climate catastrophes, dystopian police states, just-dumb-enough AI, and rampant gene hacking seem real, obvious, and avoidable to many of us, many others take them as merely naysaying distractions from the good of technosocial progress and the ever-innovating free market. Without that, we are simply presenting people who would sell everything about us for another dollar with the tools by which to make a more cultivated, compassionate, and interrelational world, and hoping that enough of them understand the virtue of those tools, before it is too late.
Technology and the Virtues is a fantastic schematic for a set of these tools. Technology and the Virtues: Oxford University Press, ,6. Moreover, Jane Crow forecloses comprehension of the disenfranchisement it engenders.
They are systematically targeted, branded as pathological, pared down to stereotype, regarded as disreputable, and ultimately deemed untenable.
I agree with Dotson: However, black women are not unknowable to themselves, especially if we consider their writing as epistemological endeavors instructive for their readers as well as their conceptualization of self. Public opinion largely classifies black women as irrelevant, and their social vulnerability permits rigid stereotypes that further their invisibility rather than inspire challenges to it. Finally, black women are susceptible to heightened epistemic backgrounding , by which they are demoted to bit players in their own stories or employed as material for juxtaposition instead of subjects of inquiry.
Murray was an accomplished writer as well as a distinguished legal scholar. In addition to academic articles and law compendiums, she produced a collection of poetry, a biography of her grandparents, and her posthumously-published memoir Song in a Weary Throat. Her anguish-rage warned me of trials I might have to face.
Her confrontation with herself as an object codified her abiding invisibility in American literature and culture even as it marked her obvious presence. Wells, Nina Simone, and Maya Angelou among others.
In Song in a Weary Throat , Murray relays the moment she decided to write her memoir late in the narrative. Her purpose for penning the book, to write about sexism during the height of twentieth-century black freedom struggles, echoes her resolve to confront systemic oppression depicted throughout her memoir.
Murray describes experiencing the material affects of Jane Crow as well as its epistemological repercussions in this period of her life. She is excluded from the legal fraternity and its extended networks due to her gender. University of Wisconsin Press, Black Women Writing Autobiography: A Tradition within a Tradition.
Temple University Press, Angelyn Mitchell and Danille K. Cambridge University Press, Giulia Fabi, and Arlene R. University of Illinois Press, Clifford, Stephanie and Jessica Silver-Greenberg. Accessed January 31, https: The Intellectual Thought of Race Women.
A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy Writing through Jane Crow: University of Virginia Press, Three Black Women of the Sixties. University Press of Mississippi, Dark Testament and Other Poems. Song in a Weary Throat: The New Press, The New Press, , Silvermine, , Silvermine, , n pag.
Columbia, , University of Illinois Press, , Lutie is aware of her invisibility among her white employers, who assume she is promiscuous, and she questions the purpose of being taught how to write, as her voice is undermined throughout the novel. Cambridge University Press, , 5.
Braxton, Black Women Writing Autobiography: A Tradition within a Tradition Philadelphia: Temple University Press, , 1. Cambridge University Press, , Perkins, Autobiography as Activism: Three Black Women of the Sixties Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, , xii.
Ards, Words of Witness: University of Wisconsin Press, , An American Pilgrimage New York: University of Illinois Press, ; Ayesha K. Hardison, Writing through Jane Crow: Smart, University of Southampton, ps02v ecs. Intellectual Virtues Required for Online Knowledge!. Search engines, intellectual virtues, and education , provides an important and timely analysis of the Internet from the standpoint of virtue epistemology. Such hazards, he suggests, motivate a consideration of the ways in which individuals should interact with the Internet.
In particular, Richard appeals to a specific branch of virtue epistemology, known as virtue responsibilism, arguing that certain kinds of cognitive trait e. Given the utility of such traits, coupled with the epistemic importance of the Internet, Richard suggests that educational policy should be adapted so as to equip would-be knowers with the cognitive wherewithal to cope with the epistemic challenges thrown up by the online environment.
There is, no doubt, something right about all this. Few would disagree with the claim that a certain level of discernment and discrimination is important when it comes to the evaluation of online content. For the most part, then, I find myself in agreement with many of the assumptions that motivate the target article. I agree that the Internet is an important epistemic resource that is unprecedented in terms of its scale, scope, and accessibility.
I also agree that, at the present time, the Internet is far from an epistemically safe environment, and this raises issues regarding the epistemic standing of individual Internet users. We thus encounter something of a dilemma: As an epistemic resource, the Internet stands poised to elevate our epistemic standing, but as an open and public space the Internet provides ample opportunities for our doxastic systems to be led astray. What ought we to do in response to such a situation?
It is at this point that I suspect my own views start to diverge with those of the target article. My own approach is somewhat different. It is borne out of three kinds of doubt: As always, space is limited and life is short, so I will restrict my discussion to issues that I deem to be of greatest interest to the epistemological community. Inasmuch as intellectual virtues are required for online knowledge—i. In judging the role of intellectual virtue in shielding us from the epistemic hazards of the online environment, it therefore seems important to have some understanding of the actual technologies we interact with.
This is important because it helps us understand the kinds of intellectual virtue that might be required, as well as the efficacy of specific intellectual virtues in helping us believe the truth and thus working as virtues in the first place. Internet technologies are, of course, many and varied, and it will not be possible to assess their general relevance to epistemological debates in the present commentary.
For the sake of brevity, I will therefore restrict my attention to one particular technology: Blockchain is perhaps best known for its role in supporting the digital cryptocurrency, Bitcoin.
It provides us with a means of storing data in a secure fashion, using a combination of data encryption and data linking techniques. For present purposes, we can think of a blockchain as a connected set of data records or data blocks , each of which contains some body of encrypted data.
In the case of Bitcoin, of course, the data blocks contain data of a particular kind, namely, data pertaining to financial transactions. But this is not the only kind of data that can be stored in a blockchain. In fact, blockchains can be used to store information about pretty much anything.
This includes online voting records, news reports, sensor readings, personal health records, and so on. Once data is recorded inside a blockchain, it is very difficult to modify. This property makes blockchains of considerable epistemic significance, because it speaks to some of the issues e. This does not mean, of course, that the information stored within a blockchain is guaranteed to be factually correct, in the sense of being true and thus yielding improvements in epistemic standing.
Nevertheless, there are, I think, reasons to regard blockchain as an important technology relative to efforts to make the online environment a somewhat safer place for would-be knowers.
Consider, for example, the title of the present article. Intellectual Virtues Required for Online Knowledge! We can incorporate this particular piece of information into a blockchain using something called a cryptographic hash function, which yields a unique identifier for the block and all of its contents. In the case of the aforementioned title, the cryptographic hash as returned by the SHA algorithm [2] is:.
Now suppose that someone wants to alter the title, perhaps to garner support for an alternative argumentative position. From an orthographic perspective, of course, not much has changed. But the subtlety of the alteration is not something that can be used to cause confusion about the actual wording of the original title—the title that I intended for the present article. Neither can it be used to cast doubt about the provenance of the paper—the fact that the author of the paper was a person called Paul Smart.
It is this property that, at least in part, makes blockchains useful for recording information that might otherwise be prone to epistemically malign forms of information manipulation. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that climatological data, as recorded by globally distributed sensors, was stored in a blockchain.
The immutability of such data makes it extremely difficult for anyone to manipulate the data in such a way as to confirm or deny the reality of year-on-year changes in global temperature. Neither is it easy to alter information pertaining to the provenance of existing data records, i.
Neither does blockchain obviate the need for agents to exercise at least some degree of intellectual virtue when it comes to the selection and evaluation of competing data streams.
Nevertheless, there is, I think, something that is of crucial epistemological interest and relevance here—something that makes blockchain and other cybersecurity technologies deserving of further epistemological attention. In particular, such technologies may be seen as enhancing the epistemic safety of the online environment, and thus perhaps reducing the need for intellectual virtue.
In this sense, the epistemological analysis of Internet technologies may be best approached from some variant of modal epistemology—e.
But even if we choose to countenance an approach that appeals to issues of intellectual virtue, there is still, I suggest, a need to broaden the analytic net to include technologies that for the time being at least lie beyond the bounds of the individual cognitive agent. Somewhat surprisingly, I disagree. Although it is obviously true that the Internet is an information space, it is not clear that this is its most salient feature, at least from an epistemological standpoint.
In particular, there is, I suggest, a sense in which the Internet is more than just an information space. As is clear from the explosive growth in all things social—social media, social networks, social bots, and so on—the Internet functions as a social technology, yielding all manner of opportunities for people to create, share and process information in a collaborative fashion.
The result, I suggest, is that we should not simply think of the Internet as an information space although it is surely that , we should also view it as a social space. Viewing the Internet as a social space is important because it changes the way we think about the epistemic impact of the Internet, relative to the discovery, production, representation, acquisition, processing and utilization of knowledge.
Smart in pressb , for example, suggests that some online systems function as knowledge machines , which are systems in which some form of knowledge-relevant processing is realized by a socio-technical mechanism, i.
An interesting feature of many of these systems is the way in which the reliability or truth-conducive nature of the realized process is rooted in the socio-technical nature of the underlying realizing mechanism.
When it comes to human computation or citizen science systems, for example, user contributions are typically solicited from multiple independent users as a means of improving the reliability of specific epistemic outputs Smart, in pressb; Smart and Shadbolt, in press; Watson and Floridi, Such insights highlight the socially-distributed character of at least some forms of online knowledge production, thereby moving us beyond the realms of individual, agent-centric analyses. On a not altogether unrelated note, it is important to appreciate the way in which social participation can itself be used to safeguard online systems from various forms of malign intervention.
One example is provided by the Google PageRank algorithm. This makes it difficult for any single agent to subvert the operation of the PageRank algorithm. Even ostensibly non-social technologies can be seen to rely on the distributed and decentralized nature of the Internet.
In the case of blockchain, for example, multiple elements of a peer-to-peer network participate in the computational processes that make blockchain work. In this way, the integrity of the larger system is founded on the collaborative efforts of an array of otherwise independent computational elements.
All of this, I suggest, speaks in favor of an approach that moves beyond a preoccupation with the properties of individual Internet users. In particular, there seems to be considerable merit in approaching the Internet from a more socially-oriented epistemological perspective.
It is easy to see the social aspects of the Internet as lying at the root of a panoply of epistemic concerns, especially when it comes to the opportunities for misinformation, deception, and manipulation. But in light of the above discussion, perhaps an alternative, more positive, take on the Internet qua social space starts to come into sharper focus. A particular issue surfaces in respect of personalized search. In fact, I suspect the consensus that has emerged in this area fails to tell the whole story about the epistemic consequences of personalized search.
Indeed, from a virtue epistemological position, I worry that epistemologists are in danger of failing to heed their own advice—prematurely converging on a particular view without proper consideration of competing positions.
My first worry is that our understanding about the extent to which search results and subsequent user behavior is affected by personalization is surprisingly poor. Consider, for example, the results of one study, which attempted to quantify the effect of personalization on search results Hannak et al. Using an empirical approach, Hannak et al. Interestingly, however, the effect of personalization appeared to be greater for search results with lower rankings; highly ranked results i.
From one perspective, of course, this tendency looks like a vice that jeopardizes the epistemic standing of the individual user. And yet, from another perspective, it looks like the preference for higher ranked search results is poised to negate or at least reduce the negative epistemological effects of personalized search.
None of this means that the epistemic effects of personalized search are to the overall benefit of individual users; nevertheless, the aforementioned results do call for a more nuanced and empirically informed approach when considering the veritistic value of search engines, as well as other kinds of Internet-related technology. A second worry relates to the scope of the epistemological analysis upon which judgements about the veritistic value of search engines are based.
In this case, it is unclear whether analyses that focus their attention on individual agents are best placed to reveal the full gamut of epistemic costs and benefits associated with a particular technology, especially one that operates in the socio-technical ecology of the Internet. To help us understand this worry in a little more detail, it will be useful to introduce the notion of mandevillian intelligence Smart, in pressc; Smart, in pressd.
Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which the cognitive shortcomings and epistemic vices of the individual agent are seen to yield cognitive benefits and epistemic virtues at the collective or social level of analysis, e. According to this idea, personalized search systems may play a productive role in serving the collective cognitive good, providing a means by which individual vices e. Consider, for example, the way in which personalized search may help to focus individual attention on particular bodies of information, thereby restricting access to a larger space of ideas, opinions, and other information.
This possibility reveals something of a tension in how we interpret or evaluate the veritistic value of a particular technology or epistemic practice. In particular, it seems that assessments of veritistic value may vary according to whether our epistemological gaze is directed towards individual epistemic agents or the collective ensembles in which those agents are situated. As Richard notes, virtue epistemology is characterized by a shift in emphasis, away from the traditional targets of epistemological analysis e.
This is, no doubt, a refreshing change, relative to the intellectual orientation of traditional philosophical debates. Nevertheless, I assume that virtue epistemologists still recognize the value and priority of truth when it comes to issues of epistemic evaluation. Someone who holds false beliefs is not the possessor of knowledge, and this remains the case irrespective of whatever vices and virtues the agent has.