147 million bitcoin charts
This is even more direct than selfish-mining attacks, as in the case of selfish mining you hurt a specific validator to the benefit of all other validators, whereas here there are often opportunities for the attacker to benefit exclusively.
In proof of work, one simple attack would be that if you see a block with a high fee, you attempt to mine a sister block containing the same transactions, and then offer a bounty of 1 BTC to the next miner to mine on top of your block, so that subsequent validators have the incentive to include your block and not the original. In proof of stake, similar attacks are possible. Even given a particular distribution of revenues from inflation and revenues from transaction fees, there is an additional choice of how the transaction fees are collected.
Though most protocols so far have taken one single route, there is actually quite a bit of latitude here. The three primary choices are:. Arguably, the more salient difference is between the first and the second; the difference between the second and the third can be described as a targeting policy choice, and so we will deal with this issue separately in a later section.
The difference between the first two options is this: However, we can get what we want by using another trick: This removes tax evasion incentives, while still placing a large portion of transaction fee revenue under the control of the protocol, allowing us to keep fee-based issuance without introducing the game-theoretic malicentives of a traditional pure-fee model. The protocol cannot take all of the transaction fee revenues because the level of fees is very uneven and because it cannot price-discriminate, but it can take a portion large enough that in-protocol mechanisms have enough revenue allocating power to work with to counteract game-theoretic concerns with traditional fee-only security.
We can extend this model further to provide other interesting properties. One possibility is that of a flexible gas limit: All transactions up to G1 would have to pay 20 shannon per gas. Above that point, however, fees would increase: Let us suppose that we agree with the points above. Then, a question still remains: Do we target a fixed level of participation in proof of stake eg. Do we target a fixed level of total inflation? Or do we just set a fixed interest rate, and allow participation and inflation to adjust?
Or do we take some middle road where greater interest in participating leads to a combination of increased inflation, increased participation and a lower interest rate? In general, tradeoffs between targeting rules are fundamentally tradeoffs about what kinds of uncertainty we are more willing to accept, and what variables we want to reduce volatility on. The main reason to target a fixed level of participation is to have certainty about the level of security.
The main reason to target a fixed interest rate is to minimize selfish-validating risks, as there would be no way for a validator to benefit themselves simply by hurting the interests of other validators.
Now, we can also get to discussing the difference between redistributing and burning transaction fees. It is clear that, in expectation , the two are equivalent: The tradeoff, once again, comes in the variance. If fees are redistributed, then we have more certainty about the supply, but less certainty about the level of security, as we have certainty about the size of the validation incentive.
If fees are burned, we lose certainty about the supply, but gain certainty about the size of the validation incentive and hence the level of security. Burning fees also has the benefit that it minimizes cartel risks, as validators cannot gain as much by artificially pushing transaction fees up eg. Once again, a hybrid route is possible and may well be optimal, though at present it seems like an approach targeted more toward burning fees, and thereby accepting an uncertain cryptocurrency supply that may well see low decreases on net during high-usage times and low increases on net during low-usage times, is best.
If usage is high enough, this may even lead to low deflation on average. Since ethereum is not meant for financial transaction only, a transaction fee is not ideal.
I would rather see ethereum get rid of transaction fee. Steem does it by rate limiting tx per address based on their balance. What do you think? I created an EIP on that here: Basically tx fees has 2 roles in the current system: I think these 2 concerns should be separated. It is assumed that with adoption the price of bitcoin will appreciate. However the cost of mining will do so concurrently.
That is the trend we have seen from its inception. Thank you for explaining the ramsey thing, and making these estimates. Now I have a hope of tuning my blockchain. Instead of inflation we should charge rent based on how many bytes of consensus space each user is using, and pay validators from this. Storing an account with twice as much money in it costs the same amount of resources. We should not subsidize people who want to split their money into lots of tiny accounts.
Anybody thinking of doing any sort of financial activity with Ethereum should probably have some great fear because of any association with Coinbase. It makes the whole currency seem kinda scammy now to be honest. I agree with your proposal of scalability. Reference is made American Ice Company which collapse in 19th. Another way have not been explored, called the diversification.
Leading those social behaviour in the proper way would have a positive impact on the problem you are trying to solve. What about the third option…increase the of transactions…increase the size of the pie from which transactions fund security.
Even if one was to believe that transfer fees remain at 0. I would like to help you, and like to share the following article form HBR. Your above analitic is fair and must provide the conditions to scale Ethereum to the Majority.
The more you get these rules clear, the more you will commit people to embrace this technology in their day to day life. A contrario, if you let thing unclear such as it is now, people will get confused and it will be the gate opened for all the populist extremist.
From the anarchy there is always an issue, the decision is your. I guess i got an ipad… but after i jailbroke it they stuck me in jail so i broke it and then sold the broken pos. I am playing with private chain on geth console recently and it says that we have to wait for 5 confirmations to ensure a block is not reversible. Is there any disadvantage of setting such rule to reduce the time waiting for confirmations?
On a side note, do you see possibilities for ethereum to be used in healthcare in a similar way that blockchain is being explored? Hi, So you mean to say convince the four largest Chinese mining pools to rent you their hardware. Adding, to take control of the product they collectively secure. Unless you are actively making an accusation against the current bitcoin miners, the underlying argument is only a sales tactic.
The tradeoff, once again, comes in the variance. If fees are redistributed, then we have more certainty about the supply, but less certainty about the level of security, as we have certainty about the size of the validation incentive.
If fees are burned, we lose certainty about the supply, but gain certainty about the size of the validation incentive and hence the level of security. Burning fees also has the benefit that it minimizes cartel risks, as validators cannot gain as much by artificially pushing transaction fees up eg. Once again, a hybrid route is possible and may well be optimal, though at present it seems like an approach targeted more toward burning fees, and thereby accepting an uncertain cryptocurrency supply that may well see low decreases on net during high-usage times and low increases on net during low-usage times, is best.
If usage is high enough, this may even lead to low deflation on average. Since ethereum is not meant for financial transaction only, a transaction fee is not ideal. I would rather see ethereum get rid of transaction fee. Steem does it by rate limiting tx per address based on their balance.
What do you think? I created an EIP on that here: Basically tx fees has 2 roles in the current system: I think these 2 concerns should be separated. It is assumed that with adoption the price of bitcoin will appreciate.
However the cost of mining will do so concurrently. That is the trend we have seen from its inception. Thank you for explaining the ramsey thing, and making these estimates. Now I have a hope of tuning my blockchain. Instead of inflation we should charge rent based on how many bytes of consensus space each user is using, and pay validators from this. Storing an account with twice as much money in it costs the same amount of resources.
We should not subsidize people who want to split their money into lots of tiny accounts. Anybody thinking of doing any sort of financial activity with Ethereum should probably have some great fear because of any association with Coinbase.
It makes the whole currency seem kinda scammy now to be honest. I agree with your proposal of scalability. Reference is made American Ice Company which collapse in 19th.
Another way have not been explored, called the diversification. Leading those social behaviour in the proper way would have a positive impact on the problem you are trying to solve.
What about the third option…increase the of transactions…increase the size of the pie from which transactions fund security.
Even if one was to believe that transfer fees remain at 0. I would like to help you, and like to share the following article form HBR. Your above analitic is fair and must provide the conditions to scale Ethereum to the Majority. The more you get these rules clear, the more you will commit people to embrace this technology in their day to day life.
A contrario, if you let thing unclear such as it is now, people will get confused and it will be the gate opened for all the populist extremist.
From the anarchy there is always an issue, the decision is your. I guess i got an ipad… but after i jailbroke it they stuck me in jail so i broke it and then sold the broken pos. I am playing with private chain on geth console recently and it says that we have to wait for 5 confirmations to ensure a block is not reversible. Is there any disadvantage of setting such rule to reduce the time waiting for confirmations?
On a side note, do you see possibilities for ethereum to be used in healthcare in a similar way that blockchain is being explored? Hi, So you mean to say convince the four largest Chinese mining pools to rent you their hardware. Adding, to take control of the product they collectively secure. Unless you are actively making an accusation against the current bitcoin miners, the underlying argument is only a sales tactic.
The counter argument being complexity has left Ethereum split. Did you guys see this? Could be the killer app for Ethereum if entire Aviation industry goes blockhain. You may use these HTML tags and attributes: The Official Ethereum Stablecoin 01st April, Ethereum scalability research and development subsidy programs 02nd January, Author miki miki Posted at 5: Author wighawag Posted at 5: Author David Jerry Posted at 5: Author Garrick Hileman Posted at 6: Author ciaranmurray Posted at 4: Author Leathan Axe Posted at 5: Author Zack Hess Posted at 8: Hi Vitalik Buterin, Thank you for explaining the ramsey thing, and making these estimates.
Author veox Posted at 9: Author hawks Posted at 9: Author bruno cecchini Posted at 9: The post is about fee not about Eth Reply. Author sLy5aM Posted at 3: Author Christian Seberino Posted at 7: So sad but so true. Author Shakedog Posted at The market is a better indication of sentiment than social media rhetoric. Author Mystisfication Posted at Thanks for your insight Vitalik!
Author Blindfolded Posted at 7: I wish you the best to succeed.