Bitcoin mining pool software games
Computer science researchers at Cornell University claim to have found a way to subvert the bitcoin mining pool software games driving production of the digital currency Bitcoin.
This could cause a chain reaction collapsing the system. Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable. This vulnerability challenges the decentralized nature of Bitcoin, a key tenet of the currency. Bitcoin is supposedly free from manipulation since it's not controlled by a government or centralized group.
The stakes are particularly high right now, as Bitcoin prices are approaching the all-time high set in April. The Bitcoin production process is called "mining.
Mashable 's senior tech analyst Christina Warren described mining as a lottery. The more computer power a miner lends to the system, the more likely he is to solve the problem and collect Bitcoin. Under this system, it is assumed that roughly, miners benefit proportionally to the amount of computer power invested.
It's important to note that the blockchain is just that — a chain. To bitcoin mining pool software games a new block, miners dedicate computing power to solving a puzzle based on the most recently published block.
The chain can fork, too, since there are multiple solutions to these puzzles. When the blockchain forks, protocol calls for miners to follow "the longest chain they know of, or the first one they heard of if there are branches of equal length," according to the Cornell researchers. Conventional wisdom and protocol calls for miners to publish blocks to the blockchain upon discovery. The sooner a miner publishes a block, the more likely he is to profit. Strategically withholding blocks can result in a disproportionate profit, according to the research.
While a solitary miner could theoretically benefit from this bitcoin mining pool software games, it is more effective for a pool of selfish miners who combine resources. While all miners work from the most recently discovered block think of it as the "original" blockthe selfish mining process begins when a pool of miners discovers a new block and doesn't publish it.
The selfish pool then begins working on discovering yet another block, mining from this hidden one. Meanwhile, the rest of the "honest" miners are still wasting resources mining from the original block. Under ideal circumstances, the selfish pool can discover a second block before the honest miners discover an alternate solution to the original block.
The more of a lead the selfish miners can establish, the more they will benefit. When the honest miners eventually publish a bitcoin mining pool software games to the original block, the selfish miners can quickly publish two blocks, making it the longer branch. Then, the rest of the miners will follow this longer branch. If the honest miners discover and publish a solution to the original block before the selfish miners can discover subsequent blocks, the selfish miners can quickly publish their block anyway.
With branches of equal length, all the miners will work on both new branches until one establishes itself as the longer branch. The selfish miners, along with an unknowing portion of the honest miners, will work on the selfish miners' branch. If it becomes the accepted part of the chain, the selfish miners can collect Bitcoin. Since using this technique supposedly allows miners to benefit disproportionally, other miners have an incentive to join the selfish pool.
The selfish pool, in turn, is inclined to accept these new miners; the larger the selfish pool, the greater its ability to discover blocks ahead of the group of honest miners. The selfish pool would therefore increase in size, unopposed by any mechanism, until it becomes a majority. Once a miner pool, selfish or otherwise, reaches a majority, it controls the blockchain. The Selfish-Mine strategy then becomes unnecessary, since the others are no longer faster than the pool. Instead, a majority pool can collect all the system's revenue by following the prescribed Bitcoin protocol, and ignore blocks generated outside the pool; it also has no motivation to accept new members.
At this point, the currency is not a decentralized currency as originally envisioned. The Cornell researchers proposed a change to the mining protocol as a partial solution to their alleged exploit. They say in the case of forked branches of equal length, bitcoin mining pool software games should choose which block to follow "at random. Indeed, a group of that size exists. BTC Guild currently mines more than a quarter of the blocks on a given day, according to Blockchain.
Bitcoin mining pool software games to the research, no group is currently employing the Selfish-Mine strategy, large mining pools are a threat to the bitcoin mining pool software games. The Cornell researchers plan to submit their work bitcoin mining pool software games a peer-reviewed journal for further scrutiny, but they have not yet named which one. For specific details, you can view the paper in its entirety below:. Bitcoin Mining Vulnerability Paper.
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