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This is just not the solution but other ways that I tried. This was a great learning experience for me so I am writing this post to document everything I tried. As a result, this post is somewhat long.

If you have any feedback, please let me know. I spent a lot of time on this writeup and I am always happy to learn new stuff. My email and twitter handle are in the sidebar. I am a bit late to the party. There were two are now other three solutions posted that I know of.

For challenge 6 I used a Kali bit VM. The challenge starts with going to their website at http: The binary is a self-extracting zip file which is supposed to show you the challenge EULA.

I opened it with 7-zip to get Challenge1. By dropping it into PE-Studio I gained more information:. Look at that garbled data. Using dotPeek we can see the code for Decode button:. Right click and select Save Resource to File. One option is to use the provided C code. I re-wrote the code in Python and ran it online using repl. Inside the archive seems to be a copy of the original http: The original web page looks a bit different. The timer threw me off track. Is it really a countdown timer? When does it reach zero?

I changed the time in my VM to mess with it but it synced up with host. Most differences are aesthetic. There are two interesting differences. So the file in the website is version 2 of the image. But wait a minute, the filesize of these images were different:. The challenge png is bigger. I used HxD to compare these two files as they are not text and at the end of flare-on. To be honest I was thinking of steganography or some Ange Albertini magic.

But that would have been too hard for level 2. Here is the PHP code beautified:. Produces the following PHP code: Base64 can be decoded in Python by calling base Line 4 can be re-written as. This looks like a POST request. PE-Studio does not tell us much.

I cheated in this challenge. I just dropped the executable in Immunity Debugger , ran it and looked in memory when the message box popped up and the email was there:.

First page is a picture of APT1 report and second page is empty. There are tools that will help us parse the PDF. You can find a good tutorial for PDF analysis here. Seems like streams 1,2 and 3 are interesting. According to the tutorial pdfvi displays them. There was a vulnerability associated with it. It is too short to be the email 14 bytes.

It is not compressed lacks the magic headers. I executed it and printed the last variable, but the result was garbage. The code just does a lot of computatation. A large number of bytes are unescaped. After reading some guides, I found out how to decode this. I wrote a simple Python program to do this decoding. The end result is some shellcode. I used this website to convert it to an executable: After running the executable in Immunity debugger a message box pops up with an encoded message.

If we look inside memory, we can find this string:. The length is close to the email 29 bytes. If it is the email then the last 13 bytes should be flare-on. If the key is smaller than 13 bytes then it is repeated and we can easily find it. If we xor the last 13 bytes of ciphertext with flare-on.

The following Python code does it. On a side note, we really need a string xor operator in Python. I wrote one which is probably not that good.

I usually wander around in the debugger and look at memory. Run the executable in Immunity and look around in memory after the message box pops up.

Right before two owneds I saw another string. This one is longer and looks more promising. Right click on it and select Follow in Dump. The key is BEEF. It is also in the initial shellcode as a string. Click on Imported Symbols and look at the red symbols. Some of them are more interesting than others. I have omitted the garbage and only kept the interesting strings:.

By this time you probably know what this file is supposed to do also look at the registry key. However, at that time I did not make the connection: Put a breakpoint at the start of this function F2 key. If we attempt to execute the tile. But we already know how to run it thanks to the strings inside the binary. In the Application textbox enter c: In Parameters enter the path to the DLL.

We observe standard stuff until we reach. Inside the function we encounter RegOpenKeyEx that opens a registry key. Full registry key is a combination of hKey and lpSubKey. The binary will check if it has access to registry at that path. If so then the return value in eax will be 0 and it will jump right JZ will succeed. RegQueryValueEx checks if there is a registry key at an open path.

It is looking for a registry key named svchost at that path. If such key exists, function will return 0. Then it will call RegCloseKey and closes the open registry path. The return value for GetModuleHandleEx will be non-zero, otherwise it will be zero. If call was not successful then last error will be printed to file.

If GetModuleHandleEx was successful it will land here. GetModuleFileName is called which will return the full path for the specified module in hModule. We have already seen the strings being loaded in lines 1 and 2. Then CopyFile is called to copy itself to c: Line 9 pushes c: Based on this string and checking for existence of the registry key we can guess what is going to happen in this function. If the key does not exist, it will create it.